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Bankruptcy
by James D. Walker, Jr.*
and Amber Nickell
I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article offers a review of recent bankruptcy law developments'
in the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit.' Two
notable areas of activity in the past year included: (1) bankruptcy court
jurisdiction, which was ruled on by the United States Supreme Court;
and (2) mortgages in Chapter 13 cases, which were the subject of both
case law and a new bankruptcy rule.
II.

JURISDICTION: STERN V. MARSHALL

In its only bankruptcy decision of 2011, Stern v. Marshall,' the United
States Supreme Court partially defined the constitutional limits on
bankruptcy court jurisdiction. The players in the case were as follows:
(1) the decedent-an elderly and wealthy Texan; (2) the debtor-the
decedent's widow; and (3) the creditor-the decedent's son from a prior
marriage and the debtor's stepson.4
When the debtor found herself cut out of the decedent's estate plan,
her lawyers publicly accused the creditor of fraud, forgery, and other

* U.S. Bankruptcy Judge, Middle District of Georgia. Augusta State University (B.A.,
1970); University of South Carolina (J.D., 1974). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
** Law Clerk to the Honorable James D. Walker, Jr., Chapman University (B.A., 1993);
Mercer University, Walter F. George School of Law (J.D., 2001). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
1. Unless specified otherwise, all statutory references in this Article are to the
Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1501 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
2. For analysis of Eleventh Circuit bankruptcy law during the prior survey period, see
Hon. James D. Walker, Jr. & Amber Nickell, Bankruptcy, Eleventh Circuit Survey, 62
MERCER L. REV. 1085 (2011).

3. 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
4. See id. at 2600. The widow in this case was Vickie Lynn Marshall, better known as
deceased celebrity Anna Nicole Smith. Id. at 2601.
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misdeeds. The debtor later filed for bankruptcy in California. The
creditor filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy case based on defamation, and he filed an adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of the debt. The debtor raised truth as a defense and filed a
counterclaim for tortious interference with an expectancy. The
bankruptcy court found in favor of the debtor and awarded her damages
in excess of $449 million. The creditor appealed to the district court.
Meanwhile, a probate court in Texas was considering whether the
decedent's estate plan was valid.6 The debtor had filed claims challenging the validity of the plan and alleging tortious interference by the
creditor. However, she withdrew her claims in the probate court after
succeeding on her tortious interference counterclaim in the bankruptcy
court. The probate court subsequently declared the estate plan to be
valid, which created a conflict with the bankruptcy court's order.
Sometime after the probate court entered its order, the district court, in
reviewing the bankruptcy court order, entered a decision in favor of the
debtor.
At issue in the Supreme Court was whether the bankruptcy court
decision or the probate court decision controlled. The bankruptcy court
decision could only control if the bankruptcy court had authority to enter
a final order on the debtor's tortious interference counterclaim.' The
Supreme Court held that it could not.' Instead, the bankruptcy court
order did not become final until affirmed by the district court.o
Because the probate court order preceded the district court order, the
probate court order had preclusive effect."
To reach its decision, the Supreme Court first addressed the bankruptcy court's statutory authority to decide the debtor's counterclaim. 2
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1)," bankruptcy judges may enter final
orders in "core proceedings arising under [Tlitle 11, or arising in a case
under [Title 11."' By contrast, only the district court can enter final

5. Id. at 2601-02.
6. Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006). Marshall involved the same case as
Stern, but a different issue. The Court provided a more detailed explanation of the
background facts in Marshall than in Stern.
7. Id. at 300-02.
8. See Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2600.
9. Id. at 2601.
10. See id. at 2608.
11. See id. at 2602-03.
12. Id. at 2600.
13. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2006).
14. Id.
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orders in matters "related to" a bankruptcy case." Congress provided
a nonexclusive list of core proceedings, including "counterclaims by the
Thus, the
estate against persons filing claims against the estate."
bankruptcy court had statutory authority to enter a final judgment on
the debtor's counterclaim." However, the bankruptcy court did not
have "the constitutional authority to do so.""
Pursuant to the United States Constitution, and to effectuate the
principle of separation of powers, only Article III judges" may exercise
the judicial power of the United States.20 The judicial power, which
may not be withdrawn by Congress, is exercised "[wihen a suit is made
of 'the stuff of the traditional actions at common law tried by the courts
at Westminster in 1789.',21 However, the Supreme Court has previously recognized that cases involving "public rights" may fall outside the
constitutional scope of judicial power and, thus, may be the subject of
final orders by non-Article III tribunals.22
While the Supreme Court has never provided a comprehensive
definition of public rights, they may include: (1) those that "can be
pursued only by grace of the other branches ... or one that 'historically
could have been determined exclusively by' those branches"; 23 (2) "those
arising 'between the Government and persons subject to its authority in
connection with the performance of the constitutional functions of the
executive or legislative departments"' rather than matters involving the
"'liability of one individual to another"'; (3) those in which the
claimed right to relief "flow[s] from a federal statutory scheme" and is
"'completely dependent upon' adjudication of a claim created by federal
law";25 and (4) those in which the claim is "limited to a 'particularized
area of the law'. . . in which Congress devised an 'expert and inexpensive method for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are

15. Id. § 157(c)(1) (2006).
16. Id. § 157(b)(2)(C) (2006).
17. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2601.
18. Id.
19. Article III judges are those who are appointed for life and whose compensation may
not be diminished. Id. at 2609; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Bankruptcy judges are
appointed to fourteen-year terms. 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2006).
20. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
21. Stern, 131 S. Ct. at 2609 (quoting N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line
Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90 (1982) (Rehnquist, J., concurring)).
22. Id. at 2610 (internal quotation marks omitted).
23. Id. at 2614 (quoting N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 68).
24. Id. at 2612 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 50-51 (1932)).
25. Id. at 2614 (quoting Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833,
856 (1986)).
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particularly suited to examination and determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task."'2 6
In summary, "what makes a right 'public' rather than private is that
the right is integrally related to [a] particular federal government
action."27 In the bankruptcy context, the Supreme Court has previously
said, "[i]f a statutory right is not closely intertwined with a federal
regulatory program Congress has power to enact, and if that right
neither belongs to nor exists against the Federal Government, then it
must be adjudicated by an Article III court."28
The debtor's counterclaim does not fit within the framework of a public
right because it is not one that is within the domain of the executive or
legislative branches. 29 In addition, it neither "flow[s] from a federal
regulatory scheme," nor is it a "claim created by federal law."30 Finally,
it does not involve a particularized area of law." Instead, the debtor's
counterclaim-an ordinary tort claim arising under state law-fits
squarely within the scope of private rights that must be adjudicated by
an Article III court." The fact that the creditor had filed a proof of
claim does not change the result." The creditor's defamation claim did
not transform the nature of the debtor's counterclaim, nor did resolution
of the creditor's claim fully resolve the debtor's counterclaim."
Although there was some overlap between the two claims-namely
whether or not the creditor had engaged in acts rising to the level of
tortious interference-the debtor's counterclaim required additional
inquiries by the Court." For example, a tortious interference claim
typically requires proof that the plaintiff expected to receive a bequest
and proof that the expectation was reasonable.3 6 "There thus was
never reason to believe that the process of ruling on [the creditor's] proof
of claim would necessarily result in the resolution of [the debtor's]
counterclaim."3 Consequently, the Supreme Court held, in ruling on

26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. (quoting N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 85; Crowell, 285 U.S. at 46).
Id. at 2613.
Id. at 2614 (quoting Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 54-55 (1989)).
See id.
Id.
Id. at 2615.
Id.
See id. at 2615-16.
Id. at 2617.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2617-18.
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the counterclaim, the bankruptcy court impermissibly exercised the
judicial power."
The Supreme Court rejected the argument that its decision would give
rise to practical problems, limiting efficiency." It noted that with
noncore "related to" matters, bankruptcy courts generally hear the case
and submit proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the
district court for de novo review.4 0 Nothing in the opinion prevents
similar procedures from being used for matters that are statutorily
defined as core but actually require the exercise of Article III judicial
4
power. '
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated its ruling addresses a
"narrow" issue and only upsets the authority of bankruptcy courts to
enter final orders "in one isolated respect."' As the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida in In re Safety
HarborResort & Spa" pointed out, "nothing in the Supreme Court's
opinion actually limits a bankruptcy court's authority to adjudicate the
other 'core proceedings' identified in section 157(b)(2)."4 Stern does not
even apply to all counterclaims asserted in response to a proof of claim;
its limitation only affects those counterclaims that are neither native to
the bankruptcy process nor capable of full resolution in the claims
allowance process."
III. CLAIMS
In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit decided two cases involving the effect of
plan confirmation on claims. One case involved a Chapter 11 plan and
postconfirmation amendment of claims." The other case involved a
Chapter 13 plan and the appropriate post-confirmation rate of interest
for oversecured claims.
In IRT Partners,L.P v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. (In re Winn-Dixie
Stores, Inc.)," the Chapter 11 debtor rejected the creditors' leases and

38. Id. at 2620.
39. See id. at 2619.
40. Id. at 2620.
41. See id.
42. Id.
43. 456 B.R. 703 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
44. Id. at 715.
45. See id.
46. See IRT Partners, L.P. v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. (In re Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc.),
639 F.3d 1053 (11th Cir. 2011).
47. See First United Sec. Bank v. Garner (In re Garner), 663 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir.
2011).
48. 639 F.3d 1053 (11th Cir. 2011).
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objected to their subsequently filed claims. The creditors did not
respond to the objection, and the bankruptcy court allowed the claims in
reduced amounts. Then, pursuant to the debtor's confirmed plan, the
creditors received shares of the debtor's common stock in full satisfaction
of their claims. After this distribution, the creditors filed amended
claims to add rejection damages. The bankruptcy court disallowed the
rejection damages.4 9 The district court and the Eleventh Circuit
affirmed.o
The Eleventh Circuit first considered the proper framing of the issue
on appeal." The creditors argued that the question was whether they
had satisfied a five-part test for determining when a claim may be
amended.52 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed." Instead, the question
was whether plan confirmation has a res judicata effect on claims,
precluding their amendment."
The Eleventh Circuit held that a confirmation order should be given
res judicata effect as to claims, absent compelling circumstances
justifying amendment of claims." The court noted that postconfirmation amendment to claims "can render a plan infeasible or alter the
distribution to other creditors" and is, thus, disfavored."
In this case, the confirmed plan expressly provided for the full
satisfaction of the creditors' prepetition claims-including rejection
damages-through distribution of common stock." Thus, "the plan
undertook to extinguish all claims, substituting for them a new
contractual relationship between [the debtor] and its creditors, defined
by the terms of the plan itself."58 Because of the res judicata effect of
plan confirmation and the absence of compelling circumstances, the
creditors could not amend their claims postconfirmation.59
Turning to Chapter 13, the Eleventh Circuit again found that
confirmation limited the creditor's rights. In First Security Bank v.
Garner (In re Garner),"o the debtor borrowed more than $30,000 at an
annual rate of 10.5% and gave the creditor a security interest in an

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1057.
Id. at 1055.
Id.
Id. at 1056.
Id.
Id. at 1056-57.
Id.
Id. at 1056.
Id.
Id. at 1056-57.
663 F.3d 1218 (11th Cir. 2011).
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assortment of vehicles." The debtor filed for Chapter 13, and proposed
62
to repay the creditor-who was oversecured-at the prime-plus rate of
4.25% annually." The creditor objected to confirmation, arguing it was
entitled to the contract rate."
The bankruptcy court ruled that the creditor was only entitled to the
contract rate until confirmation; thereafter it was entitled to prime-plus
66
interest. 65 The district court and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The
Eleventh Circuit first noted that oversecured creditors are entitled to
postpetition interest pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 506(b)6 ' and that they are
entitled to the contract rate of interest between the petition date and the
confirmation date.6 8 Next, the court considered the appropriate rate
following confirmation." It noted that under both Supreme Court
precedent and Eleventh Circuit dicta, § 506(b) applies only during the
preconfirmation period to set the amount of the allowed secured
claim.o Upon confirmation, the debtor may rely on 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)
(5)(B) 71 to modify the creditor's rights, "including the rate of interest."" Thus, the reduction of the creditor's interest rate to prime-plus
in this case was consistent with the provisions of the Bankruptcy
Code."
IV.

PROFESSIONALS

Attorneys cannot evade court review of their fees by agreeing to accept
a prepetition retainer in full satisfaction of their services, according to
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida
in In re Ford." The court examined all Chapter 11 cases that were

61. Id. at 1219.
62. In Till v. SCS Credit Corp., 541 U.S. 465 (2004), the Supreme Court considered the
appropriate rate of interest for secured creditors whose claims were subject to cram
down-in which the present value of secured portion of the claim is paid in full and
unsecured portion is paid pro rata. Id. at 469. A plurality held that creditors are entitled
to the prime rate plus a risk factor ("prime-plus" or "formula" rate). Id. at 479-80. This
formulation is commonly referred to as Till interest.
63. In re Garner, 663 F.3d at 1219.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 11 U.S.C. § 506(b) (2006).
68. In re Garner, 663 F.3d at 1220.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
72. In re Garner, 663 F.3d at 1220-21.
73. See id. at 1221.
74. 446 B.R. 550 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
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pending during a particular twenty-one-month period." In doing so,
it found a certain attorney had failed to file fee applications in ninety
cases. 6 In each of the ninety cases, the attorney filed a disclosure of
compensation indicating his receipt of a retainer and stating his
understanding that the retainer was subject to review by the court for
reasonableness. Nevertheless, the attorney contended no fee application
was necessary in the cases at issue because he agreed to accept the
retainer in full satisfaction of his services, even though fees incurred
exceeded the amount of the retainer. Thus, no harm resulted from
Furthermore, his actions were
failure to file a fee application.7
"consistent with an informal local practice that has evolved among the
local bankruptcy bar.""
The court rejected the attorney's arguments and concluded that his
practices were improper because they did not comply with the statutory
scheme for approval of fees." Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 2016, anyone seeking compensation in a bankruptcy case
must file an application that includes a statement of services provided
and the amount requested.so No fee application means no notice and
hearing as required by Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2002(aX6),
no review by the U.S. Trustee as required by 28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3)(A),8"
and no court review for reasonableness as required by 11 U.S.C.
§ 330.82 Following the appropriate procedures is necessary both to
"preserve[] the public perception of the integrity of the bankruptcy
system" and to establish "that compensation for the professional is
reasonable and based on actual and necessary services." 3 Therefore,
even those professionals who seek payment only from a prepetition
retainer must file a fee application and obtain court approval for their
compensation.
In In re Dorn," the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Middle
District of Florida had an opportunity to evaluate the reasonableness of
unusually high fees requested by a debtor's attorney in two Chapter 7
cases. Most attorneys in the locality (Orlando) with a high-volume case

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 552.
Id.
Id. at 553.
Id. at 554.
Id.
Id. at 551.
28 U.S.C. § 586(a)(3XA) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
11 U.S.C. § 330 (2006); In re Ford, 446 B.R. at 554.
In re Ford, 446 B.R. at 555.

84.

Id.

85. 443 B.R. 555 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2011).
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load typically charged a flat fee of $1,250 to $2,500 for a Chapter 7 case.
Such attorneys and their paralegals generally spent a combined time of
five to ten hours per case.86
By contrast, the attorney at issue charged $3,450 in one no-asset case
and $3,369 in another slightly more complicated case. The attorney
spent ten to eleven hours per case, and her paralegal spent about seven
hours per case. The attorney's hourly rate was $295, and her paralegal's
hourly rate was $105. Furthermore, the attorney's practice differed from
that of high-volume filers in several ways. First, she only filed about ten
cases per year. Second, she marketed herself as providing a premium
or luxury service by which she personally guided the debtor through the
bankruptcy process and handled many services that are typically handed
off to paralegals. Third, she offered to refer debtors to less expensive
attorneys.
The court held that, based on the attorney's hourly rate, which was
reasonable given her experience, the amount of hours she typically spent
on a case, and the highly personalized services she provided, her fees
were reasonable." The court noted that the debtors were apparently
satisfied with the attorney's services and did not object to the fees."
The court further refused to set a cap on fees in Chapter 7 cases,
noting that the market is a better arbiter of rates and that not all
debtors "have the same preferences when it comes to attorneys."o The
court's only concern was reasonableness of fees."
Although the
attorney's fees were higher than average for Orlando, they were
reasonable "for what she provided].""
V. BANKRUPTCY ESTATE
Facing an unusual set of facts and somewhat puzzling legal arguments, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of
Alabama in Shields v. Adams (In re Adams)" concluded that a § 542
(a)" action to recover undisclosed income, filed by the Chapter 13
trustee against a Chapter 13 debtor, does not become property of the

86. Id. at 555-57.
87. Id. at 555-58.
88. Id. at 559.
89. Id. at 558. The U.S. Trustee, not the debtors, objected to the attorney's fee
applications. Id.
90. Id. at 559.
91. See, e.g., id. at 557.
92. Id. at 559 (alteration in original).
93. 453 B.R. 774 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 2011).
94. 11 U.S.C. § 542(a) (2006).
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Chapter 7 estate when the case is converted." While the debtor's
bankruptcy case was pending, he received and spent $55,000 in
undisclosed income and received an undisclosed income tax refund. The
debtor conceded the money was property of the Chapter 13 estate. The
Chapter 13 trustee filed an adversary proceeding for turnover of the
funds under § 542(a). The debtor voluntarily converted his case to a
Chapter 7." While conceding that the undisclosed funds did not
become property of the Chapter 7 estate, the Chapter 7 trustee
contended the turnover proceeding did become property of the Chapter
7 estate and could be prosecuted by the Chapter 7 trustee.
The court first noted that it was unclear that the Chapter 13 trustee
had standing to initiate a § 542(a) suit and, thus, it was unclear whether
there was a valid suit to pass into the Chapter 7 estate. In a § 542(a)
turnover proceeding, the trustee can only recover property that he has
the right to "use, sell, or lease under section 363."99 However, §
1303100 grants such rights to the debtor, "exclusive of the trustee."o1
Without deciding the standing issue, the court pointed to another
problem that had not been addressed by the parties: whether the trustee
could recover funds from the debtor if the debtor no longer had
them.102 The court noted a split of authority on the question and again
declined to decide the issue. 0 3
Finally, the court considered whether a § 542(a) action initiated by a
Chapter 13 trustee becomes property of the Chapter 13 estate that can
pass to the Chapter 7 estate upon conversion.0 4 The court looked to
11 U.S.C. § 54110 and 11 U.S.C. § 130606 after finding no relevant
case law.' 0 ' Section 541(a) defines property of the estate, in general,
as a broad range of the debtor's interests in property on the petition
date.108 Section 1306(a) provides that postpetition earnings and afteracquired property of the kind specified in § 541(a) become property of the

95. In re Adams, 453 B.R. at 780.
96. Id. The conversion was found to be in bad faith and the debtor consented to denial
of a Chapter 7 discharge. Id.
97. Id. at 775-76.
98. Id. at 777.
99. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 542(a).
100. 11 U.S.C. § 1303 (2006).
101. In re Adams, 453 B.R. at 777; 11 U.S.C. § 1303.
102. In re Adams, 453 B.R. at 777.
103. Id. at 777-78.
104. Id. at 778.
105. 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
106. 11 U.S.C. § 1306 (2006).
107. In re Adams, 453 B.R. at 778-79.
108. See, e.g., id.
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estate.o' Thus, if the turnover action was the type of property listed
in § 541(a), it would have become property of the estate under § 1306(a)."o Section 541(a) primarily applies to property owned by the
debtor."' However, § 541(a)(7) provides that the estate includes lalny
interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement of
the case.""' Nevertheless, the court determined this provision did not
apply to the § 542 action, noting that "the power to seek turnover
pursuant to § 542 is a 'statutorily created power to recover property,' not
an interest in property itself."1 Thus, the § 542 action never became
property of the Chapter 13 estate and could not become property of the
Chapter 7 estate.114 Consequently, the Chapter 7 trustee could not
pursue a § 542 cause of action."'
VI. DISCHARGE
Student loans are notoriously difficult to discharge, absent some
catastrophic disability that leaves a debtor permanently unable to work.
In Wieckiewicz v. Education Credit Management Corp.,116 the Eleventh
Circuit approved additional hurdles-of an administrative nature-for
those seeking discharge of student loan debt."'
The debtor filed an adversary proceeding to determine the dischargeability of his student loans." Student loans may be discharged only
if they impose an undue hardship on the debtor."' The Eleventh
Circuit applied the three-part Brunner120 standard to test for undue
hardship.' 2 ' The debtor must demonstrate: (1) that he "cannot maintain . . . a minimal standard of living"; (2) "additional circumstances

exist indicating that this state of affairs is likely to persist for a
significant portion of the [student loan] repayment period"; and (3) he
"has made good faith efforts to repay the loans."122

109. Id. at 778.
110. See id. at 779.
111. Id. at 780.
112. Id. at 779; 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(7) (emphasis added).
113. In re Adams, 453 B.R. at 779-80 (quoting Moyer v. ABN AMRO Mortg. Grp., Inc.
(In re Feringa), 376 B.R. 614, 624 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 2007)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. 443 F. App'x 449 (11th Cir. 2011).
117. See id. at 450, 452.
118. See id. at 450.
119. Id. at 451; 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
120. Brunner v. New York State Higher Educ. Serv. Corp., 831 F.2d 395 (2d Cir. 1987).
121. Wieckiewicz, 443 F. App'x at 451.
122. Id. (citing Brunner, 831 F.2d at 396) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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While the debtor's dischargeability case was pending, the bankruptcy
court ordered the debtor to apply for loan consolidation through the
William D. Ford Federal Direct Loan Program, which could have reduced
his loan payments to $0. If the debtor qualified for the program he
probably would not be able to establish undue hardship; but if he did not
qualify, he likely could prove undue hardship. When the debtor refused
to apply for the program, the court dismissed the adversary proceeding.123
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal.124 First, the court
noted that the bankruptcy court has inherent authority "to dismiss
actions for failure to . . . obey court orders""' but only when "necessary

to protect its ability to function . . [or] to facilitate activity authorized
by statute or rule."'2 6 Second, the court noted that the bankruptcy
judge extended considerable patience and consideration toward the
debtor after ordering him to apply for consolidation.127 The judge
convened a hearing to consider the debtor's eligibility for the Ford
program, granted the debtor an extension of the time to apply, and
offered to protect him from any negative effects of the program.128
Despite the bankruptcy judge's efforts, the debtor refused to comply with
the court's order to apply for consolidation.129
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that, under the circumstances, the
bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the adversary
proceeding.13 The debtor's eligibility for the loan program could have
a determinative effect on the adversary; therefore, the bankruptcy court
had a nonfrivolous reason to order the debtor to apply.'"' Despite
significant accommodations offered by the judge, the debtor refused to

123. Id. at 450-51.
124. Id. at 452.
125. Id. at 450.
126. Id. at 451 (quoting In re Novak, 932 F.2d 1397, 1406 (11th Cir. 1991)) (alteration
in original).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 451-52. The mention of negative effects is likely a reference to the potential
income tax implications of the Ford program. The Ford program offers an income
contingent repayment option in which payments are based on ability to pay and may be
as low as $0. See Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Stanley, 300 B.R. 813, 818 n.8 (N.D. Fla.
2003) (dismissing concerns about income tax liability as speculative). After the debtor
completes twenty-five years of payments, any balance remaining on the loan is forgiven.
Id. The amount forgiven may become part of the debtor's taxable income. Id.
129. Wieckiewicz, 443 F. App'x at 451.
130. Id. at 452.
131. Id.
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comply with the order. 132 Thus, dismissal of the adversary proceeding
was appropriate.1 3 1
VII. AVOIDANCE
According to the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Georgia in Hope v. Acorn Financial, Inc. (In re Fluellen),'3 1 if a
bankruptcy trustee is aware of potential preference actions prior to plan
confirmation but does not act on them, the entry of the confirmation
order may prevent her from pursing them postconfirmation.xa The
debtor gave the creditor a security interest in his vehicle. However, the
creditor did not perfect the security interest until after the debtor filed
a Chapter 13 petition. The trustee learned of these events approximately thirty days prior to the date set for the confirmation hearing. The
confirmation hearing proceeded as scheduled and the debtor's plan,
which treated the creditor as secured, was confirmed. Two weeks after
confirmation, the trustee initiated an adversary proceeding to avoid the
creditor's security interest and to treat the creditor as unsecured.13 1
The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to the creditor, and
the district court affirmed. 3 7
At issue in In re Fluellen was whether the trustee was bound by the
confirmation order.'
Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a),139 "[the
provisions of a confirmed plan bind the debtor and each creditor."140
The parties agreed that by this language, "confirmation of a Chapter 13
plan may satisfy the requirements for claim preclusion and therefore
prevent relitigation of matters that either were raised or could have been
raised prior to confirmation."141 However, the statute says nothing
about binding the trustee. The trustee argued that under principles of
statutory interpretation, the omission should be considered intentional.142 The district court disagreed. 143
The district court first noted that the Eleventh Circuit has held that
any objections to classification of a claim must be raised prior to

132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id.
Id.
No. 5:11-CV-276, 2012 WL 74874 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 10, 2012).
See id. at *5-6.
Id. at *1.
Id. at *2, *6.
Id. at *2.
11 U.S.C. § 1327(a) (2006).
In re Fluellen, 2012 WL 74874, at *2; 11 U.S.C. § 1327(a).
In re Fluellen, 2012 WL 74874, at *2.
Id.
Id. at *3.
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confirmation. 14 4 Here, the trustee's avoidance action would effectively
reclassify the claim from secured to unsecured after the plan had been
confirmed.14 5 In addition, multiple courts have held that the res
judicata effect of plan confirmation applies to all parties to confirmation,
including the trustee-at least to the extent that "the facts supporting the
trustee's post-confirmation challenge were discoverable pre-confirmation."'4 6 For these reasons, the court held that "under the specific facts
of this case, the binding effect of confirmation applied to the Trustees." 47
VIII.

AUTOMATIC STAY/DISCHARGE INJUNCTION

In 2011, the Eleventh Circuit ruled on the limits of both the automatic
stay and the discharge injunction. In Jacks v. Wells FargoBank (In re
Jacks),148 the court held that internal bookkeeping entries by a creditor
do not violate the automatic stay.149 And, in Florida Department of
Revenue v. Diaz (In re Diaz),so the court held that a child support
collection agency does not violate the discharge injunction when it
attempts to collect unpaid prepetition interest on past due child support
that had been disallowed as part of the creditor's claim.'
In In re Jacks, the mortgage creditor had incurred attorney fees of
$310 for preparing a proof of claim and reviewing the debtors' Chapter
13 plan. The amount was charged to the debtors' account on the
creditor's internal books. However, the creditor did not include the
amount on the statements mailed to the debtors and did not otherwise
seek payment of the fees. The debtors claimed the notation violated the
automatic stay by attempting to collect property of the estate, attempting to enforce a lien against the estate, and attempting to collect a
prepetition claim."' The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.'13 The notation had no effect on the debtors' account balance, the creditor never
made any communications that could be interpreted as a request to pay
the fees, and the creditor made no effort to extend its lien to include the
fees.'54 The Eleventh Circuit held:

144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id.
See id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *6.
642 F.3d 1323 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1329.
647 F.3d 1073 (11th Cir. 2011).
Id. at 1092.
642 F.3d at 1327-28.
Id. at 1330.
Id. at 1329-30.
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Neither possession nor control of the property was affected by [the
creditor's] entry of the fees on its internal records. Absent some other
overt attempt ... to recover these fees from the estate or to gain
advantage over other creditors, the entries .. . do not constitute a

violation of the automatic stay.1ss
In In re Diaz, the creditor had filed a proof of claim for past due child
The debtor objected to the interest porsupport'5 plus interest.'
tion of the claim. The creditor did not respond to the objection, and the
bankruptcy court disallowed the interest. The debtor's plan provided for
full payment of the principal. The debtor completed all his plan
payments and received a discharge. Sometime thereafter, the domestic
support obligation (DSO) creditor attempted to collect the unpaid
interest.' 8 The bankruptcy court found that in doing so, the creditor
violated the discharge injunction."' The district court affirmed.'
The Eleventh Circuit reversed. 1

First, the Eleventh Circuit noted that DSOs are nondischargeable in
bankruptcy."' Because the discharge injunction does not apply to
such debts, it cannot be violated by attempts to collect such debts.'
Furthermore, disallowance of a portion of the DSO claim has "no bearing
on whether any portion of the debt is discharged.""'
Second, the court held that the bankruptcy court did not adjudicate
the amount of the debtor's liability for the DSO when it disallowed a

155. Id. at 1329.
156. Child support is a domestic support obligation (DSO) as defined in 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(14A) (2006). DSOs are nondischargeable pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (2006 &
Supp. IV 2010).
157. In re Diaz, 647 F.3d at 1080.
158. Id. at 1080-81.
159. Id. at 1082. The bankruptcy court also found violations of the automatic stay. Id.
However, the Eleventh Circuit held that sovereign immunity barred the automatic stay
claims. Id. at 1086. Generally, a governmental unit cannot raise sovereign immunity
when accused of violating the automatic stay because the stay is necessary for the court
to exercise its in rem jurisdiction over property of the estate. Id. States are deemed to
have consented to such exercise ofjurisdiction by their ratification of the Constitution. Id.
at 1083-84. However, the debtor in this case did not raise the automatic stay claims until
after the discharge had been entered and property of the estate had been fully distributed.
Id. at 1086. Thus, the stay "was no longer necessary or even operative to assist the
bankruptcy court in exercising its in rem jurisdiction." Id. (emphasis omitted).
160. Id. at 1082.
161. Id. at 1093.
162. Id. at 1089.
163. Id. at 1090. In the course of its analysis, the court held, as a matter of first
impression, that postpetition interest on a DSO is nondischargeable. Id. at 1090 n.14.
164. Id. at 1090.
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portion of the claim.'e Instead, "the only issue before the bankruptcy
court at the time of the claim objection was the amount of the childsupport debt that would be paid by the bankruptcy estate through [the
debtor's] Chapter 13 plan, not the total amount of the child-support
debt."6 Thus, principles of preclusion did not apply to prevent the
creditor from effectively relitigating the amount of the liability by
attempting to collect the unpaid interest."' Of course, the creditor
cannot attempt to collect amounts already paid in the bankruptcy
case. 6 8 If it does so, the debtor's proper recourse lies in state
court. 69
IX.

DISCRIMINATION

Section 525170 protects debtors from certain types of discrimination
solely based on their bankruptcy history, including employment
In Myers v. TooJay's Management Corp.,172 the
discrimination."'
Eleventh Circuit held that the protections of § 525 do not extend to
hiring by private employers.1 7
In Myers, the debtor underwent a lengthy application process for a
managerial position at a restaurant. The application included a
background check that revealed the debtor's prior bankruptcy. The
restaurant refused to hire the debtor due to the bankruptcy.17 4 The
debtor argued that the refusal to hire violated § 525(b), which provides
that a private employer may not "terminate the employment of, or
discriminate with respect to employment against" a bankruptcy
debtor. 7 s The Eleventh Circuit disagreed.'
The court compared the language of § 525(b), relating to private
employers, to § 525(a), relating to government employers. 77 Under
§ 525(a), government employers may not "deny employment to, terminate
the employment of, or discriminate with respect to employment against"

165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Id. at 1091.
Id. (emphasis omitted).
Id. In addition, preclusion does not apply to nondischargeable debts. Id. at 1092.
Id. at 1093.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 525 (2006).
Id.
640 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir. 2011).
See id. at 1284-87.
Id. at 1280-82.
Id. at 1282; 11 U.S.C. § 525(b).
Myers, 640 F.3d at 1284.
Id. at 1283-84.
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Applying well-established principles of
a bankruptcy debtor."'
statutory construction, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that the inclusion
of a bar on denial of employment in one section of the statute and its
omission from another section of the statute were intentional by
Congress.1' The court explained that "[h]ad Congress wanted to cover
a private employer's hiring policies and practices in § 525(b), it could
have done so the same way it covered a governmental unit's hiring
policies and practices in § 525(a)."so Furthermore, because the section
applying to the government regulates both hiring and discrimination in
employment (while private employers are only barred from discrimination), the discrimination language must refer to something other than
hiring, such as discrimination "in promotions, demotions, hours, pay, and
so forth."18 Finally, the court reasoned that interpreting the statute
in favor of the debtor would support the purpose of bankruptcy to
provide debtors with a fresh start. 8 2 However, when the plain
language of the statute conflicts with the purpose of bankruptcy law, the
plain language prevails. 8 1

X. CONSUMER ISSUES
Chapter 13 Residential Mortgages
An authorization in 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5)'" allows Chapter 13
debtors to cure their mortgage arrearages through the Chapter 13 plan,
while maintaining their regular postpetition mortgage payments outside
the plan.' 5 As a result, upon the completion of all plan payments, the
debtor's mortgage should be fully cured and current. 186 Instead,
debtors sometimes find themselves in default upon completion of the
plan due to improper accounting practices and other problems within the
creditor's organization and are often unable to get any response from the
creditor to deal with the problem.s' Last year, two bankruptcy courts
rejected the efforts of debtors to include special provisions in their plans
A.

178.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at 1283; 11 U.S.C. § 525(a) (emphasis added).
Myers, 640 F.3d at 1284.
Id. at 1285.
Id. at 1285-86,
Id. at 1286.
Id.
11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (2006).
In re Jackson, 446 B.R. 608, 609 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011); 11 U.S.C.
In re Jackson, 446 B.R. at 609.
Id. at 610.

§ 1322(b)(5).
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for the purpose of avoiding such a result.'8M However, on December 1,
2011, a new bankruptcy rule went into effect that is aimed at accomplishing the same goal, but in a uniform manner nationwide."'9
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 3002.1, which only applies to
mortgage claims on a Chapter 13 debtor's principal residence that are
subject to § 1322(b)(5) treatment, requires the creditor to provide the
debtor, the debtor's attorney, and the trustee with (1) notice of any
change in payment amount at least twenty-one days before the new
amount is due; and (2) notice of postpetition fees recoverable against the
debtor within 180 days after the fees were incurred.9 o The debtor and
trustee will then have one year to file a motion disputing that the fees
are required to cure a default or to maintain payments.' 9 '
Once the debtor has completed all plan payments, the trustee has
thirty days to provide notice to the creditor, the debtor, and the debtor's
After receiving the
counsel that the default has been fully cured.'
notice, the creditor has twenty-one days to file a supplement to its proof
of claim, stating whether or not it agrees that the default has been cured
The supplement
and whether the debtor is current on payments.'
must also itemize any amounts the creditor contends are unpaid.9'
The debtor or trustee then has twenty-one days after the creditor files
its supplement to file a motion to "determine whether the debtor has
cured the default.""' If the creditor fails to comply with its require-

188. Id. at 611-12; In re Duke, 447 B.R. 365, 372 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 2011). The debtors
in these cases proposed a nearly identical set of special provisions. See In re Jackson, 446
B.R. at 609-10; In re Duke, 447 B.R. at 372-73. The courts rejected some of the provisions
as duplicative of current laws and rejected others because they violated current law. In
re Jackson, 446 B.R. at 611; In re Duke, 447 B.R. at 368-71. The courts determined that
allowing such special provisions would result in increased costs and administrative
inefficiencies throughout the Chapter 13 system due to the extra analysis the plans would
require. In re Jackson, 446 B.R. at 611; In re Duke, 447 B.R. at 371.
189. See In re Jackson, 446 B.R. at 610; In re Duke, 447 B.R. at 372.
190. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002.1(a)-(c). The notice of payment change and the notice of
expenses must be filed as supplements to the proof of claim; two new official
forms-Supplement 1 and Supplement 2 to Form 10-have been created for this purpose.
U.S. BANK. COURT, NOTICE OF MORTGAGE PAYMENT CHANGE, B 10SI SUPPLEMENT 1(2011),

available

at

http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK%20Form-

s%20Pending%201211/B_010S1.pdf; U.S. BANK. COURT, NOTICE OF POSTPETITION
MORTGAGE FEES, EXPENSES, AND CHARGES, B 10S2 SUPPLEMENT 2 (2011), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK%20Forms%2OPending%2Ol
211/B_010S2.pdf.
191. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002.1(c) advisory committee's note.
192. FED. R. BANKiR. P. 3002.1(f).
193. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002.1(g).

194. Id.
195. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002.1(h).

2012]

BANKRUPTCY

1179

ments under Rule 3002.1, the court may exclude the "omitted information .. . as evidence in any contested matter or adversary proceeding" or
may award other appropriate relief.'96

B.

Chapter 13 NonresidentialMortgages

While a debtor's options for dealing with a residential mortgages are
limited, the debtor has more options when it comes to debt on investment real estate. If the maturity date of the debt extends beyond the
length of the plan, the debtor may use 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5), which
allows for defaults to be cured under the plan and for "maintenance of
Or, under 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2),e8 the
payments" by the debtor.'
debtor may modify the rights of the creditor by dividing the claim into
secured and unsecured portions under 11 U.S.C. § 506(a),199 paying the
secured portion in full and paying a pro rata share of the unsecured
portion.20 0
What happens if a debtor proposes to do both, as the debtors did in In
re Elibo20 ' and In re Agustin?202 These cases shared a common fact
pattern as follows: The debtor owned investment real estate that was
substantially underwater, with the mortgage maturing after completion
of the Chapter 13 plan.203 The debtor proposed to bifurcate the debt
and to pay the secured portion according to the mortgage's original
maturity schedule with a reduced interest rate, resulting in a significantly lower monthly payment.204 In both cases, the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Florida rejected the
debtor's proposal.205
Debtors with long-term debt may bifurcate the creditor's claim
pursuant to § 506(a) and § 1322(b)(2) while paying the debt beyond the
term of the plan under § 1322(b)(5).20 ' However, they may only do so
if they satisfy the requirement in § 1322(b)(5) to maintain payments.o7

196. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002.1(i).
197. In re Elibo, 447 B.R. 359, 362 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011); 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5).
198. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2006).
199. 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) (2006).
200. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
201. 447 B.R. at 362.
202. 451 B.R. 617 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011).
203. In re Elibo, 447 B.R. at 361; In re Agustin, 451 B.R. at 618.
204. In re Elibo, 447 B.R. at 361; In re Agustin, 451 B.R. at 618.
205. In re Elibo, 447 B.R. at 364; In re Agustin, 451 B.R. at 620-21.
206. If the debtor does not invoke § 1322(b)(5), then all payments must be made within
the applicable three- or five-year period, in accordance with § 1322(d). See In re Elibo, 447
B.R. at 362.
207. Id. at 363; In re Agustin, 451 B.R. at 620.
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As the court in In re Elibo noted, "maintenance of payments in
§ 1322(b)(5) means that the debtor must respect the interest rate and
the monthly payment in the mortgage contract during the plan and after
Thus, if the debtors want to
completion of [plan] payments . . . .
alter their contractual payments (by reducing the interest rate), they
must pay the secured claim in full during the applicable plan term
(rather than over the term of the loan).20 s

C.

Chapter 20 Lienstripping

Lienstripping involves reducing a lien to the value of the underlying
collateral (strip down) or avoiding the lien in its entirety when there is
no value in the collateral due to the existence of senior liens (strip
off). 2 1 0 In Chapter 7, both types of lienstripping are generally impermissible. 211 By contrast, Chapter 13 permits modification of the rights
of most secured claim holders.212 An exception applies to mortgages
Such mortgages cannot be
on the debtor's primary residence.2 3
however, if the mortgages
secured;
partially
stripped down if they are
to
the
existence of senior liens,
due
attach to no equity in the collateral
214
they may be entirely stripped off.
Now, certain consumer debtors are raising a related issue, one that
has split bankruptcy courts throughout the country,1 s and has now
divided bankruptcy courts within the Eleventh Circuit.216 The question is whether a Chapter 20 debtor can strip off a junior lien held by a
creditor whose claim is wholly unsupported by value in the collateral.
A Chapter 20 debtor is a debtor who files a Chapter 13 case shortly
after receiving a Chapter 7 discharge. 2 17 As mentioned above, Chapter
13 debtors can usually strip off wholly unsecured junior liens.218
However, according to some courts, the existence of a prior Chapter 7
discharge adds a wrinkle.'19 Under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f), 2 20 a debtor

208. 447 B.R. at 363 (quoting KEITH M. LUNDIN & WILLIAM H. BRowN, CHAPTER 13
12-14 (4th ed.)).
BANKRUPTCY § 128.2, at
209. Id. at 364-65; In re Agustin, 451 B.R. at 620.

210. In re Gerardin, 447 B.R. 342, 345 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011).
211. Id.

212. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(bX2).
213. In re Gerardin, 447 B.R. at 345.
214. Id.

215. See In re Jennings, 454 B.R. 252, 256 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 2011) (collecting cases).
216. See In re Quiros Amy, 456 B.R. 140, 145 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011).
217. See, e.g., In re Jennings, 454 B.R. at 253-54.
218. In re Quiros Amy, 456 B.R. at 144.
219. See, e.g., In re Gerardin,447 B.R. at 346; In re Quiros Amy, 456 B.R. at 143. In
re Gerardinwas a joint opinion by three judges-Judges Mark, Isicoff, and Cristol-in seven
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is not entitled to a Chapter 13 discharge if he received a Chapter 7
discharge in the four years prior to filing his Chapter 13 case. 22 ' The
availability of a discharge comes into play under 11 U.S.C. § 1325,222
which governs the treatment of an "allowed secured claim" in a Chapter
13 plan. 223 The wholly unsecured junior creditor holds an allowed
secured claim because its debt is secured by a lien enforceable against
the debtor's property 224 and its claim has not been disallowed.22 1
Assuming the debtor intends to retain the collateral and the creditor
does not accept the plan, the plan must provide that the creditor will
retain its lien until the debt, as determined by nonbankruptcy law, is
paid in full or until the debtor receives a discharge.226 Because the
Chapter 20 debtor is ineligible for a Chapter 13 discharge, the debtor
cannot remove the lien prior to fully satisfying the underlying debt.2 27
Thus, the lien cannot be stripped.22 8
However, one bankruptcy court, the United States Bankruptcy Court
for the Northern District of Georgia, has concluded that § 1325(a)(5) does
not apply to the claim of a wholly unsecured junior lienholder in a
Chapter 20 case.229 On the contrary, the court held that "nothing in
the Bankruptcy Code prevents [Clhapter 20 lien stripping."2 0 It
reasoned that the creditor holds an allowed unsecured claim pursuant
to § 506(a), which classifies claims as secured only to the extent the
creditor has an interest in the value of the collateral. 23 ' Because the
creditor's junior lien cannot attach to any equity, its claim is classified
as unsecured.23 2 Consequently, its treatment under the plan must

bankruptcy cases. In re Gerardin,447 B.R. at 343. Like In re Gerardin,In re Quiros Amy
arose in the Southern District of Florida, but was written by Judge Olsen, who was not one
of the three judges involved in the In re Gerardin opinion. In re Quiros Amy, 456 B.R. at
141.
220. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(f) (2006).
221. Id. § 1328(f)(1).
222. 11 U.S.C. § 1325 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
223. Id. § 1325(a)(5).
224. In re Gerardin, 447 B.R. at 346. Although the debtor's personal liability on the
debt was discharged by the Chapter 7 case, the creditor still holds a claim that can be
treated under a Chapter 13 plan. Id.
225. See, e.g., id. at 346-47; In re Quiros Amy, 456 B.R. at 146.
226. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(5)(B).
227. In re Gerardin,447 B.R. at 352.
228. Id.
229. In re Jennings, 454 B.R. at 256-58.
230. Id. at 258.
231. Id. at 258-59.
232. Id. at 254.
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satisfy the best interests test of § 1325(a)(4) but need not satisfy
2 34
§ 1325(a)(5).233 Once the plan is completed, the lien will be void.
This issue likely is rendered moot by the Eleventh Circuit's recent
unpublished opinion in McNeal v. GMAC Mortgage LLC (In re McNeal)."1 In McNeal, the court held that the Chapter 7 debtor could
strip off a wholly unsecured second lien on her home.236 In doing so,
the court ruled that its 1989 decision in Folendore v. United States
Small Business Administration3 7 was unaffected by the Supreme
Court's 1992 decision in Dewsnup v. Timm."' If wholly unsecured
junior liens can be stripped off in Chapter 7, they will not be an issue if
the debtor later files a Chapter 13 case.
XI.

CONCLUSION: LOOKING AHEAD

Bankruptcy developments in 2011 were largely driven by changes in
consumer bankruptcy law. By contrast, in 2012, we can expect Supreme
Court rulings addressing Chapter 12 and Chapter 11 issues. In Hall v.
United States,"' which was argued in November 2011, the Court will
decide whether capital gains tax incurred by the postpetition sale of the
debtor's farm may be paid under the Chapter 12 plan as an administrative expense. 2 4 In RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated
Bank,24 1 the Court will consider whether a Chapter 11 debtor who sells
assets free of liens may bar credit bidding by instead offering the
creditor the indubitible equivalent of its claim.24 2

233. Id. at 259.
234. Id. at 255.
235. No. 11-11352 (11th Cir. May 11, 2012).
236. Id. at 3.
237. 862 F.2d 1537 (11th Cir. 1989).
238. Id. at 3-4 (citing Dewsnup v. Timm, 502 U.S. 410 (1992)).
239. 617 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. granted(U.S. June 13,2011) (No. 10-875). The
Court decided Hall after this Article was written. It held that the tax at issue was not
incurred by the estate and, therefore, it cannot be discharged upon completion of the
Chapter 12 plan. 2010 WL 5535748 at *5.
240. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Hall v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2989 (2010) (No.
10-875), 2010 WL 5535748 at *2-5.
241. 651 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted (U.S. Dec. 12, 2011) (No. 11-166).
242. Petition for Writ of Certiorari, RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated
Bank, 132 S. Ct. 845 (2011) (No. 11-166), 2011 WL 3511028 at *3.

